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As Richard Rushton and Gary Bettinson comment early in their new introduction to film 
theory since 1960, film theories ‘do not spring from nothingness. They are agitated into 
being by pre-existing, inferior propositions; they hark back to archaic, forgotten 
hypotheses; they open dialogue with cognate theories which they serve to complement, 
finesse, or qualify’ (Rushton and Bettinson 2010, 11-12). In just the way Rushton and 
Bettinson describe, the film-critical proposal I shall put forward here is not an entire new 
theory, but a revised approach to a concept – identification – which most definitely harks 
back to more secure, less multiplicitous days in film-philosophy and originates 
predominantly in pre-existing propositions, and qualifies cognate theories. By 
‘identification’, I am indeed referring to the manner in which film spectators engage with 
film characters, but also to another kind of identification that has come centre stage in 
film theory and criticism through the important influence existential phenomenology has 
had on film theory since the publication of Vivian Sobchack’s The Address of the Eye: A 
Phenomenology of Film Experience (1992). Sobchack’s development of a Merleau-
Pontyan model of the experience of film viewing requires us to consider, rather than 
identification with characters, our identification with ‘the sense and sensibility of 
materiality itself’ (Sobchack 2004, 65) – the materiality of the film, celluloid or digital.  
 
In psychoanalytic terms, such an identification with filmic materiality is called ‘primary’ 
identification, to distinguish it from the ‘secondary’ identifications that occur once the 
infant’s subjectivity gains sufficient definition and stability to form affinities with 
characters, real or fictional. The most frequently-cited context for primary identification 
is the Lacanian mirror stage, when the infant first perceives its bodily identity as a 
totality, either by seeing its image in a mirror or feeling it ‘reflected’ in the literal or 
metaphorical look of a parent.  Lacan’s primary identification describes the child feeling 
the limits of its body for the first time, gaining motor control of its limbs, and leaving 
behind – or at least learning how to overcome – the corps morcelé or ‘body-in-bits-and-
pieces’ he suggests is characteristic of very early infancy. The relationship implied by 
this type of identification is the one between the nascent ego and the infant-subject rather 
than that between an infant-subject and its other, and the feeling of coherence or totality 
involved is more dependent on other modes of perception than the look. Since Lacanian 
theory tends to associate primary identification with the mirror stage, it may encourage 
the view that primary identification precedes secondary identification chronologically, or 
developmentally, in the life of a subject, when in fact, although secondary identifications 
cannot by definition be accomplished until the identifying subjectivity has undergone the 
necessary formative repressions and splits, primary identifications continue to alternate 
with secondary ones thereafter. As will become clear in my second section, this co-
extensive functioning of the two modes of identification closely resembles the 
equiprimordiality of body and vision theorized by Merleau-Ponty, who sets out his 
concept of the chiasm of the visible and the invisible (according to which visibility and 
2 
 
invisibility are inextricably intertwined with one another) in The Visible and the Invisible 
(1964/1968).   
 
In an essay published twelve years after The Address of the Eye, Sobchack summarises 
her thinking on identification as follows: 
 
we might wish to think again about processes of identification in the film 
experience, relating them not to our secondary engagement with and recognition 
of either ‘subject positions’ or characters but rather to our primary engagement 
(and the film’s) with the sense and sensibility of materiality itself (Sobchack 
2004, 65). 
 
In inviting film critics to reconsider primary identification in 2004, Sobchack’s was a 
relatively lonely voice in the film-philosophical community: a keyword search for 
‘identification’ in the MLA Bibliography turns up thirty-four items from the 2000s in 
whose title it appears, but the majority of these address the concept in relation to 
particular films or types of film, with only about nine undertaking to consider it across 
film as a medium. (Authors of these include Kimberley Chabot Davis, on whose work I 
shall draw in what follows.) The principal film-theoretical publication to discuss 
identification in the 1990s, albeit to seek to replace it with a new model of spectatorship, 
was probably Murray Smith’s Engaging Characters: Fiction, Emotion and the Cinema 
(1995). Smith confirmed in response to Lynne Pearce’s rather confused review of his 
book, in which she claimed that ‘it is Smith’s objective to produce a more sophisticated 
model of what we mean by “identification”’ (Pearce 1996, 417), that ‘If E[ngaging] 
C[haracters] is anything.[…].it is a detailed argument regarding the inadequacies of the 
notion of “identification”’ (Smith 1999, 360), and went on to distinguish critically 
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between what he called its ‘everyday sense’ and its ‘more technical, psychoanalytic 
guises’ (ibid). Bizarrely, although apparently willing to concede in his reply to Pearce 
that more than one version of identification can indeed be found in over a century of 
psychoanalytic literature, Smith had claimed in Engaging Characters that identification 
is a ‘uniform’ concept, and insufficiently ‘subtle and discriminating’ to ‘describe and 
explain our variegated responses to character’ (Smith 1995, 106). He had also 
undermined his own claim about this, however, by acknowledging that a Lacanian 
version of psychoanalysis dominates studies of cinematic identification (Smith 1995, 
236): to acknowledge that the concept has non-Lacanian versions is to acknowledge that 
it is not uniform. 
 
Whatever the inconsistencies in his argumentation, however, the elision of ‘the’ (sic) 
psychoanalytic concept of identification Smith makes with the Lacanian version of the 
concept at the start of Engaging Characters, ignoring Freud and other theorists who have 
approached the concept differently, is in fact typical. To redress the balance in favour of 
Freud et al., I shall now outline some other psychoanalytic and phenomenological 
versions of the concept, on the basis of which it may be possible to rethink how we use it 
in film analysis. 
(Re)thinking Identification, Through the Body 
What is different about identification in non-Lacanian accounts? For Lacan, identification 
always involves an image: ‘We have only to understand the mirror stage as an 
identification, in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation 
that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image’ (Easthope 1993, 34). For Freud 
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it does not: the three modes of identification Freud ‘eventually’ distinguishes between in 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) are: (1) the primal form of the 
emotional tie with the object, (2) the regressive replacement for an abandoned object-
choice (3) a tie that takes place in the absence of any sexual cathexis, ‘to the extent that 
[the subject and the other person] have some trait in common’ (Laplanche and Pontalis 
1974, 207). Identification involves the ego and is ‘the operation…whereby the human 
subject is constituted’ (ibid. p.206): this is also the account used by Judith Butler in 
Chapter 2 of Gender Trouble (1990) and Chapter 3 of Bodies That Matter (1993). 
Identification with the lost object, for Freud as for Butler, is 
 
not simply momentary or occasional, but becomes a new structure of identity; in 
effect, the other becomes part of the ego through the permanent internalization of 
the other’s attributes (Butler 1990, 58). 
 
 
What is interesting about the different, image-governed construction of identity set out by 
Lacan in his essay on the mirror stage is that in arguing this he did not acknowledge that 
he was privileging Freud’s Platonic, mimetic account of identification which worked in 
terms of a Vor-bild (an ‘image-before’), and suppressing the one also in Group 
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego that spoke of the emotional tie with the object 
(the Gefühlsbindung). Identification is not necessarily optical or spatial. As Mikkel 
Borch-Jacobsen states in Lacan: the Absolute Master, ‘Identification, if we take Freud 
seriously, escapes from the mirror stage at the very moment when it makes this stage 
possible’ (Borch-Jacobsen 1991, 66). Specular identification can only be produced ‘on 
the (abyssal, non-‘subjectal’) ground of a preliminary affection, by the ‘other’ that ‘I’ am 
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‘myself’ prior to any perception, any representation, any ‘posing-before’. This is what 
Borch-Jacobsen calls Freud’s unconscious and ‘profoundly blind’ Cogito, if there is such 
a thing. As well as constituting a kind of Cogito within the Freudian system, the 
Gefühlsbindung or ‘preliminary affection’ Borch-Jakobsen refers to closely resembles 
Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualisation of intersubjectivity as anonymous and prepersonal. 
Initially set out in Phenomenology of Perception (1945), this understanding of 
intersubjectivity follows neither a rationalist, Enlightenment model of a community of 
autonomous subjects nor traditional epistemology’s posing of the ‘problem’ of other 
minds. Merleau-Ponty, like Heidegger, does not consider the question of the existence of 
other minds to be a valid ‘problem’, since for him, our subjective experience of others is 
of other selves – embodied, flesh-and-blood beings with whom our meaningful 
encounters are social and precognitive. In emphasising the prepersonal, anonymous and 
prereflective character of intersubjective relations, Merleau-Ponty is very close to 
Lacan’s emphasis on the Symbolic order as one manifestation of the Other with a capital 
‘O’, or to Freud’s conviction that the unconscious dominates social experience. It must be 
emphasised, however, that the Gefühlsbindung or ‘preliminary affection’ that binds us to 
one another remains just that, a bond or ‘identification’ that is irreducible to identity. For 
psychoanalysis as for Merleau Ponty’s theory of intersubjectivity, identifications never 
achieve or seal an identity between the identifying parties, but remain permanently open, 





Lacan’s 1938 article on the family complexes (Lacan 1984) shows that he was not 
unaware of the dimension of Freud’s thinking he was suppressing by privileging a 
specular, mimetic notion of identification and by constructing his theory of the stade du 
miroir, formulated in 1936 but not delivered in its definitive form until 1949. 
‘Identification…is not specular at first, but “affective”’ (Borch-Jacobsen 1991, 67). 
Lacan freely admits in the 1938 text that the mirror stage is a second stage in terms of 
genesis: the first imago is not that of the child itself, but is the maternal archi-imago, 
which is not an image. ‘The content of this image is given by the sensations proper to 
earliest childhood, but it has form only insofar as the sensations are mentally organised’ 
(ibid.; my emphasis). It couldn’t be more clearly stated, as Borch-Jacobsen says: ‘The 
maternal imago is not an image or an object or a form or a representation’. The earliest tie 
with an object is, as Freud said, an ‘emotional tie’ that precedes the distinction between 
‘subject’, ‘object’, ‘self’ and ‘other’, which is a profoundly identificatory tie. What is 
important about this passage in the 1938 article is that Lacan recognises a pre-specular 
relationship to the imago before the mirror stage and ‘that he plants – something he will 
never do again – the subsequent dialectic of specular identifications in that initial 
affective ambivalence, seeing in this ambivalence the “undialecticizable matrix” of that 
dialectic’ (ibid: 68). (This ‘initial affective ambivalence’ or ‘preliminary affection’ is, as 
pointed out above, hard to distinguish from Merleau-Ponty’s ‘invisibility’, and the 
manner in which it grounds Lacan’s subsequent dialectic of egoic specular identifications  
resembles Merleau-Ponty’s ‘chiasm’ of  the visible and the invisible, despite Lacan’s 




This pre-history of identity construction found in the writings of both Freud and Lacan, 
though suppressed by the latter after 1938, bears striking resemblances to the work of 
other psychological theorists on early child development, and to the phenomenology 
Merleau-Ponty began to formulate during the 1930s. One does not have to dig far into the 
historical context of Lacan’s formulation of the stade du miroir (the mid 1930s), to find 
other accounts of early child development that differ markedly from the dialectic of 
specular identification Lacan describes as being set in train at the mirror stage. In 
contemporary film theory Kaja Silverman, despite standing out among her peers for her 
continuing loyalty to Lacan, draws extensively on the Austrian neurologist and analyst 
Paul Schilder and on the French child analyst Henri Wallon, both of whom give highly 
un-Lacanian accounts of the bodily ego and of the child’s interaction with its image. The 
summary Silverman gives in Threshold of the Visible World (1996) of Schilder’s 
arguments about the ‘postural model of the body’, or the ‘image of the body’, as he calls 
it, runs as follows: 
 
Therefore, it would seem that one’s apprehension of self is keyed both to a visual 
image or constellation of visual images, and to certain bodily feelings, whose 
determinant is less physiological than social. […] Lacanian psychoanalysis, with 
its emphasis on the ego as a product of specular relations, has made it extremely 
difficult to theorize the role played there [i.e. in ego formation] by bodily 
sensation (Silverman 1996, 14).1 
 
                                                 
1 Gail Weiss says of Merleau-Ponty’s account of early child development that ‘the body 
image first appear[s] during the “mirror stage” (from 6-18 months of age) as a corporeal 
schema which requires, but cannot be reduced to [my emphasis] the infant’s awareness of 
her/his specular image as an image of her/his own body’ (Weiss 1999, 11). 
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According to Wallon, ‘the visual imago, or “exteroceptive ego” is initially disjunctive 
from what he calls the “proprioceptive ego,” and […] the unity which they subsequently 
form is at best tenuous’ (Silverman 1996, 14-15). Whereas Lacan ‘describes the infant’s 
encounter with its specular reflection as more of a punctual event than an ongoing 
process […] [a]ccording to Wallon, on the other hand, a lengthy period intervenes 
between the child’s first exposure to a mirror and the moment at which the reflected 
image is psychically incorporated. During this period, the mirror image remains 
stubbornly exterior’ (Silverman 1996, 15).  In Threshold of the Visible World, Silverman 
coins the term ‘identity-at-a-distance’ to describe this gap between the child and its 
reflected body image, providing the necessary explanation as she does so that such ‘an 
identity is, of course, inimical to the very concept implied by that word, which literally 
means “the condition or quality of being the same” (OED, 881). Identity-at-a-distance 
entails precisely the opposite state of affairs – the condition or quality of being “other”’ 
(Silverman 1996, 15). She terms the infant psychic agency involved (which cannot be the 
ego, by definition in formation during this very process) the ‘sensational body’, though 
goes on to use Wallon’s term ‘proprioceptive body’ and Schilder’s ‘postural model of the 
body’ interchangeably with ‘sensational body’. In her reading of a experimental Austrian 
film called Syntagma (Valie Export, 1983), Silverman explains that the sensational body  
 
is responsible for the experience which each of us has of occupying a point in 
space…It is produced through tactile, cutaneous and kinaesthetic sensations. 
Although this body is primarily responsible for our experience of corporeal 
reality, it is no less a representation than the body produced through the clicking 
of the camera/gaze. It is created initially through the parental touch, and later 




Most importantly for my argument here, this body is not a visual body: Silverman states 
that both Schilder and Wallon ‘agree that this sensational body can never really be “one” 
with the image that we are for ourselves and others’ (Silverman 2000, 6). ‘For neither of 
these writers is this a lamentable circumstance. For Schilder, the separation of the 
sensational imago from the visual imago is the condition for change and growth. And for 
Wallon, this disjunctive relation is the norm at the beginning of life. The children he 
describes ‘remain for an extended period at a psychic distance from their mirror 
reflections’ (ibid). Tantalizingly, Silverman then says that ‘in certain situations, the adult 
subject can also become aware once again of the gap separating his or her sensational 
body from the corporeal image’, and names cinematic spectatorship as one of these 
situations: a gap that separates the sensational body from the corporeal image is ‘a normal 
feature’ of cinematic viewing that is ‘in no way pathological’ (ibid.). Gail Weiss, another 
feminist theorist of body images, backs this up when she says that ‘what is distinctive 
about Merleau-Ponty’s and Schilder’s accounts is that they extend our understanding of 
the centrality of the body image in all aspects of experience for “normal” as well as 
physiologically impaired subjects’ (Weiss 1999, 7). 
 
What might the implications of this disjunctive relation between sensational body and 
visual imago be for cinematic viewing? As Weiss’s 1999 study of embodiment as 
intercorporeality underlines, a kind of traffic in body images goes on continuously at a 
pre-or sub-egoic level between viewers and the images of bodies they perceive. This 
applies to ‘normal’ subjects, not just to ‘physiologically impaired’ people, and may not 
be limited to the unspecified ‘certain situations’ mentioned by Silverman. (In this 
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connection, why should it be necessary for an adult viewer to be consciously aware of 
‘the gap separating his or her sensational body from the corporeal image’ [Silverman 
2000, 6] at all?.) Schilder’s, Wallon’s and Merleau-Ponty’s psychologies of perception do 
not employ categories of the conscious and unconscious mind anything like as rigorously 
as Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. When it is child development that is under 
consideration, the body images perceived are reflections of children’s own bodies, but for 
film viewers, they are the panoply of differently sized, coloured and focused human 
forms seen on the cinema screen. If the identifications viewers make while watching a 
film are as much ‘primary’, bodily, affective ties with the materiality of the film and its 
images as they are ‘secondary’ identifications with characters influenced by those 
characters’ actions, narrative function and psychology, then cinematic spectatorship 
begins to look like an activity in which viewers’ identities are exposed and liable to re-
formation. Bodily sensation and perception may also play a far larger part in cinematic 
viewing than film theory and criticism have tended to assume. 
 
The implications of the concept of the sensational body (Silverman), proprioceptive body 
(Wallon) or postural model of the body (Schilder) for film criticism might be 
considerable, I would suggest. Silverman’s affirmation that it is ‘produced through 
tactile...and kinaesthetic sensations’ and continues to be created in adult life ‘through 
contact with the outer world’ (Silverman 2000, 6) resonates strongly with the sensate and 
sensuous character of film viewing emphasized by commentators such as Laura Marks in 
The Skin of the Film (Marks 2000) and Touch (Marks 2002). Recent phenomenological 
approaches to film spectatorship such as the work of Sobchack, Marks, and Jennifer M. 
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Barker (2009) are entirely in harmony with the sensate character of what Silverman terms 
‘identity-at-a-distance’, a condition arguably described and explored throughout the 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. Indeed, the common feature of all the psychological 
and philosophical sources I have drawn on thus far – Freud on non-visual identification, 
and Schilder, Wallon, and Merleau-Ponty on the gap between the sensational and visual 
bodies – is the distance, blindness and bodiliness characteristic of a certain type of 
identification. By reviving and drawing on this important theoretical work from the first 
half of the twentieth century in Threshold of the Visible World, Silverman brought 
insights to 1990s film theory that have not yet been given their due, or put into 
meaningful dialogue with other, contemporary developments in film-philosophy. 
 
Cultural Bodily Identity 
An important reason why Kaja Silverman’s work on the sensational body can contribute 
to the trajectory of psychoanalytically- and phenomenologically-informed film criticism  
I am formulating and arguing for here, despite her continuing loyalty to Lacan,2 is the 
strongly cultural direction her thinking takes in Threshold of the Visible World.  
Specifying in her introduction that ‘the larger project of this book is to offer an ethics of 
the field of vision, and a psychoanalytic politics of visual representation’ (Silverman 
                                                 
2 Silverman is the only one of the theorists to have contributed to what she calls ‘identity-
at-a-distance’ to develop the notion in relation to film, which makes it all the more 
disappointing that in ‘Speak, body’, her article from 2000 on Syntagma, she re-encloses 
identity-at-a-distance within a Lacanian framework by insisting that it is ‘later….traded 
in for one predicated upon a fictive unity’ (Silverman 2000, 6).  
12 
 
1996, 2), Silverman goes on to argue that it is because ‘the look is under cultural pressure 
to apprehend the world from a preassigned viewing position’ (ibid., 3) that visual texts 
have a particular ‘power to re-educate the look’ (ibid., 5). Cinema and other visual 
cultural forms, in other words, maintain the ‘power’ to teach us otherness, to test, 
enhance and continually (re-)educate our repertoire of cultural images, with the heavily 
formulaic codes of entertainment cinema much less likely to do this than the more 
exploratory images usually associated with independent and gallery-exhibited film. This 
‘power to re-educate the look’ is both ethical and political, and stems in part from the 
visible cultural specificities – size, skin colour, age, sex – of the images of bodies seen in 
visual texts. (In Silverman’s view the identifications we may make with these bodies are 
always preceded by an idealization, ‘that psychic activity at the heart of love’ (ibid., 2)). 
Similarly cultural thinking about embodiment is to be found in critiques of the neutral, 
unmarked status the body has in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology offered by feminist 
theorists Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler.3 In the words of Gail Weiss, ‘by developing the 
lacunae and critically extending the implications of these aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s and 
Schilder’s accounts of the body image, a richer feminist understanding of how racial, 
gender, class, age and cultural differences are corporeally registered and reproduced can 
                                                 
3 See Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference (trans. Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. 
Gill, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) and Judith Butler, ‘Sexual Ideology and 
Phenomenological Description: A Feminist Critique of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology 
of Perception’ (in Jeffner Allen and Iris Marion Young, eds., The Thinking Muse: 




be achieved’ (Weiss 1999, 10). Among cultural critics of film, meanwhile, Kimberley 
Chabot Davis stands out for insisting that dialogue and cross-fertilization between 
psychoanalytic and ethnographic approaches to film spectatorship are possible, and for 
starting to forge just such links: in ‘An Ethnography of Political Identification: The 
Birmingham School Meets Psychoanalytic Theory’, Chabot Davis combines an 
understanding of subjectivity influenced by post-structuralism, feminism, psychoanalysis 
and queer theory with data from interviews she conducts with readers and viewers of a 
cultural style she calls ‘sentimental postmodernism’, and summarises her approach by 
saying that in her ‘work, audience ethnography and theories of subjectivity are 
dialectically engaged with one another rather than at odds’ (Chabot Davis 2003, 3). 
Although her work stands out for its deliberate harnessing-together of theoretical currents 
usually considered incompatible, however, it is just one example of a remarkable quantity 
of high-quality writing on cultural identification published by feminist and queer critics 
since the early 1990s.4 
 
To return to the politico-cultural aspects of the film viewer’s bodily identity – his/her 
race, gender, body shape, age – it is noteworthy that ethnographic audience research often 
reveals instances of identifications that could not have been predicted on the basis of the 
most obvious aspects of a viewer’s identity.  For example, in Chabot Davis’s study of 
audience responses to Kiss of the Spider Woman (novel, film and musical versions), ‘only 
half of the gay men that I interviewed identified with the effeminate gay character 
                                                 
4 Diana Fuss’s work in Identification Papers (1995) is perhaps the best-known reference 
in this field. 
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Molina, and many in fact identified with Valentin, the macho political prisoner who 
could be read as either straight or bisexual’ (Chabot Davis 2003, 5). Further evidence 
Chabot Davis finds of white viewers identifying with Jews and Native Americans 
indicates the prevalence of such ‘cross-group identifications’, which ‘highlight the fact 
that a singular identity category cannot wholly define people or their ability to relate to 
others’ (ibid.). Subjectivity is not only multilayered but subject to change: it divides 
between the multiple emotional axes offered by film narratives, and shifts over time (in 
Chabot Davis’s words, it ‘can be experienced as a palimpsest, in which previous 
identities are never completely erased’ [Chabot Davis 2003, 6]). However, as should be 
evident by now, it is not just the multi-layeredness and modifiability of spectatorial 
subjectivity I want to insist on here, but the spectator’s culturally complex relationships 
with on-screen bodies as body images – visual imagos, to use Schilder’s psychological 
term.  In order to rethink the fixity and inflexibility that tend to result from understanding 
our identifications with film characters as secondary identifications, while continuing to 
make film-critical use of the concept of identification, our densely layered bodily bonds 
with on-screen body images need to be broken down and considered in all their 
complexity. In my view, this can best be achieved by using a non-Lacanian 
psychoanalytic and phenomenological concept of bodily, sensate identification, one 
which allows consideration of the multiple cultural marks of our embodied identities as 





My aim in this essay, then, in addressing spectatorial engagement with film and film 
images via a less familiar approach to the concept of identification, has been to move 
towards a methodology for analysing the cultural identifications made in spectators’ 
responses to films that constitutes a new alternative to (for example) the model proposed 
by Murray Smith in Engaging Characters.  The fusing of the disciplinary areas of critical 
theory and cultural studies over the 1990s and 2000s means that the openness of any 
theory to cultural politics such as queer and race-related politics has become a key 
criterion in its appeal and success. The model of spectator-character relations formulated 
by Smith in Engaging Characters is variegated and subtle, but is a model that effectively 
re-neutralises the vital gains made by identity politics of the 1980s and 1990s, and the 
fusion of identity politics with cultural theory during the 1990s and 2000s. If, rather than 
turning our backs on the admittedly burdensome complexity of a film criticism that tries 
to keep pace with the increasingly antagonistic claims of global identity politics, a 
reading of identification is pursued that follows Freud, Schilder, Wallon, Merleau-Ponty 
and Sobchack, rather than Lacan, in which the identifying spectatorial body is un-sutured 
from its visual image, then a path is opened up to a new mode of queer, black, feminist 
and other politico-theoretical readings, in which new kinds of transactions between 
spectators and films become possible. These new transactions may in turn keep alive at 
least some of the unfulfilled aspirations of political film criticism of the past. 
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